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BETTER A DRUG DEALER THAN A DRUG BUYER? THE THIRD
CIRCUIT GRAPPLES WITH THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN UNITED STATES v. SMACK
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Smack,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit confronted what it considered a "poorly drafted and confus-
ing"2 Application Note within the current edition of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Sentencing Guidelines"). 3 In particular,
the court considered the effect of the last sentence of Application Note 12
("Application Note 12" or "Note 12") in the context of "reverse sting" op-
erations. 4 Reverse sting operations are those in which "a government
agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant."5
These differ from conventional sting operations in which a government
agent buys or negotiates to buy a controlled substance from a defendant.6
1. 347 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2003).
2. See id. at 534 (stating that nebulous drafting of Application Note 12 com-
pounds complexities of Smack).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (providing sentencing guidelines for drug convictions resulting from both
"sting" and "reverse sting" operations).
4. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 (noting "there is considerable room for argu-
ment about how Note 12 ... should operate in [the reverse sting context]").
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 14 (2003);
see also United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001)
(describing reverse sting as "a transaction where the government arranges for the
defendant to purchase... drugs from an undercover government agent"); United
States v. Panduro, 152 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that "[i]n a
reverse sting, the defendant agrees to buy a certain amount of drugs for a certain
prearranged price"); Conrad F. Meis, Comment, United States v. Tucker: The Ille-
gitimate Death of the Outrageous Governmental Conduct Defense?, 80 IowA L. REv. 955,
955 (1995) (describing that "[i]n a reverse sting, government agents pose as deal-
ers of contraband in transactions that they arrange"); Bobbie Stein, Cops Make
Crack in California: California's Reverse-Sting Operation, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1995,
at 22 (describing reverse sting operation in California). The Orange County Po-
lice Department actually used powder cocaine seized in other drug busts to manu-
facture cocaine base or "crack." See Stein, supra, at 22 (recounting "Orange
County's crack operation"). The police then used the crack for reverse stings. See
id. (same).
6. See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire AfterJacobson v. United States:
Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055,
1056-57 (1993) (comparing traditional "stings," in which government agents offer
to purchase contraband or illegal services from defendant, with "reverse stings," in
which law enforcement personnel act as sellers and use various techniques to pro-
mote sales of substantial quantities of narcotics to unsuspecting buyers); Meis,
supra note 5, at 955 ("In a typical sting operation, a government agent seeks to
purchase contraband to identify sellers."). Meis also contends that although con-
ventional sting operations have been a popular law enforcement tool for many
(981)
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In other words, defendants are drug sellers in conventional stings, and
defendants are drug buyers in reverse stings. 7
Application Note 12 states that in unconsummated "agreement[s] to
sell a controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled
substance shall be used to determine the offense level."8 This is the rule
"unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately
reflects the scale of the offense."9 Thus, in a conventional sting, the quan-
tity of a controlled substance that a defendant agreed to sell determines
the defendant's offense level, unless the sale is completed and the actual
quantity sold suggests using a different offense level. 10 In a reverse sting,
however, the quantity of a controlled substance that a defendant agreed to
purchase may conclusively determine the defendant's offense level, re-
gardless of the amount actually purchased. 1
years, reverse stings have only recently become popular. See Meis, supra note 5, at
955 (discussing government use of sting operations).
7. See Amy Levin Weil, In Partial Defense of Sentencing Entrapment, 7 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 172, 178 n.29 (1995) (explaining that in "straight sting" cases, defen-
dant is seller of drugs); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda; Seizing the Property of Drug Dealers, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1998, at 11
[hereinafter Blumenson & Nilsen I] ("The reverse sting is an apparently lawful
version of police drug dealing in which police pose as dealers and sell drugs to
unwitting buyers."); Lenny Savino, Judge Releases 33 Sting Suspects; The Kissimmee
Drug Arrests, Witnessed by Lt. Gov. Frank Brogan, May be a Form of Entrapment, the judge
Said, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1999, at DI ("In reverse stings, undercover police
officers offer to sell drugs and then arrest potential buyers."); Weekend Edition Satur-
day: Asset forfeiture from drug-related arrests and how some law enforcement agencies use the
funds (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Weekend Edi-
tion] (stating that "[i] n a traditional drug sting, undercover cops pose as drug buy-
ers to bust a dealer. In a reverse, the cops become the seller and arrest the
buyer.").
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12 (2003);
see also United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 184 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
under Sentencing Guidelines, "it is clear that the Base Offense Level for a drug-
trafficking offense is a function of the quantity of the drugs involved in the of-
fense"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1089 (2002); United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 324
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding that "Application Note 12 to Section 2Dl.1 sets forth the
method by which the appropriate quantity of drugs is determined if the offense
involves negotiation to traffic in drugs"); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d
488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "Application Note 12 to Section 2D1l ad-
dresses the method of determining the appropriate quantity if the offense involves
negotiation to traffic in narcotics"); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1004
(3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that Section 2D1.1 "imposes punishment for drug-re-
lated crime based on the type and weight of drugs involved in the criminal
activity").
9. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12 (2003);
see also Yeung, 241 F.3d at 325 (noting that "if a defendant is to be tarred for sen-
tencing purposes with a larger quantity than was delivered, that quantity must have
been negotiated or agreed upon prior to delivery").
10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (stating that when quantity delivered more closely reflects scale of offense,
that quantity should be used for sentencing purposes).
11. See id. ("In contrast, in a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the
controlled substance would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense be-
[Vol. 49: p. 981
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The last sentence of Application Note 12 provides a method for drug
sellers in unconsummated transactions to escape sentencing for the full
amount of negotiated quantities, if the sellers show that they were either
incapable of delivering or did not truly intend to deliver those quanti-
ties. 12 It is unclear, however, whether drug buyers involved in reverse st-
ings are also afforded this benefit.' 3 Although the language of Note 12
suggests they are not,1 4 no reason is given for this exclusion and principles
of fairness caution against such a result. 15 Furthermore, with the dramatic
increase in the popularity of reverse stings in recent years, 16 the need for
cause the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the
defendant.").
12. See id. (noting that when "the defendant establishes that he or she did not
intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon
quantity of the controlled substance," courts shall reduce their base offense level
accordingly); see also United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that current Application Note 12 only requires defendants show either
lack of intent or ability); United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2000)
("This provision, added in 1995 .... [made] lack of either intent or capability a
ground for reducing the quantity for which a defendant could be sentenced. The
previous Note 12 had permitted a reduction ... only if a defendant lacked both
intent and capability.").
13. For a discussion of the circuit split arising from this ambiguity, see infra
notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the language of Application Note 12, see infra notes
43-71 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
"[t]raditional principles of criminal law would suggest... that buyers should also
have the benefit of the mens rea and impossibility defenses in the last sentence,
mutatis mutandis"); see also United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 436 n.II (3d Cir.
1994) (interpreting prior version of Note 12 and holding it would be fundamen-
tally unfair if only in "unconsummated drug transactions by sellers would the gov-
ernment have to demonstrate that the defendant intended and was able to
complete the negotiated transaction").
16. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 35, 67 (1998) [hereinafter Blumenson & Nil-
sen II] (explaining that reverse stings are "now [a] common police tactic that
[were] rarely ... used before the law began channeling forfeited assets to those
who seized them"); Interdisciplinary Program Series Transcript, The New Chicago
School: Myth or Reality?, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 10 (1998) (quoting Tracey
L. Meares) ("Reverse stings ensure that residents remain in the community. Not
only that, reverse stings redistribute the consequences of law enforcement racially
because it turns out that people who buy drugs are much more demographically
varied than those who sell them."); Gayle Worland, Drug Suspects Get Cuffs, Not Co-
caine; Reverse Sting in City Nets 463 Accused Buyers, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2003, at C1
(noting that reverse sting operations "yielded more than 2,300 arrests for at-
tempted possession of a controlled substance" in only two months). This reverse
sting netted 463 buyers in a single day, making it the largest one-day effort of its
kind in the nation. See Worland, supra, at C1 (describing sting operation); see also
Blumenson & Nilsen I, supra note 7, at 11 (observing that "[b]uyers may be less
dangerous and less culpable, but operations against them are easier and safer, and
reliably result in seizure of the buyer's cash"). Proponents of reverse stings con-
tend they are effective drug control mechanisms and better distribute the costs of
drug arrests throughout society. See Weekend Edition, supra note 7 (stating that
"[r]everse stings used to be rare. Police departments started doing more of them
2004] CASEBRIEF 983
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clarification of Note 12's scope has led the Third Circuit to explicitly re-
quest action by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing
Commission" or "Commission").17
This Casebrief reviews the Third Circuit's critique of Application
Note 12 of the Sentencing Guidelines, and also looks at its effect on the
sentencing of drug traffickers.' 8 Part II examines both Section 2D1.1 and
Application Note 12 of the Sentencing Guidelines.' 9 Part III discusses the
development of the Third Circuit's approach to Application Note 12, trac-
ing the evolution of its interpretation within that circuit.20 Part IV ad-
dresses the possible effects of Application Note 12 on the sentences of
individuals involved in drug trafficking.2 1 Finally, Part V considers the po-
tential impact of Application Note 12 on practitioners. 2 2
II. SECTION 2Dl.1 AND APPLICATION NOTE 12
A. Background and Purpose of Section 2D1.1
The United States Sentencing Commission promulgates the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines under statutory authority. 2 3 Pursuant to the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 ("Reform Act"), a sentencing court generally must
select a sentence for a particular offense from within the respective range
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. 24 The Commission devel-
oped the Sentencing Guidelines in an effort to further the three major
after asset forfeiture came into vogue."). Some critics of asset forfeiture point to a
potential conflict of interest, as the forfeited assets go directly to the police agen-
cies that seize them. See id. (describing possible conflict of interest).
17. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 534 (stating "[w] e ... call upon the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to revise Application Note 12 to clarify the scope of drug transactions
to which the intent and capability defenses apply").
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's critique of Application Note 12, see
infra notes 109-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Application Note
12's effect on sentencing, see infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the background of Section 2D1.1 and Application
Note 12, see infra notes 23-71 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the development of the interpretation of Application
Note 12 in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 72-139 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the effects of Application Note 12 on the sentencing of
drug traffickers, see infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the ramifications of Application Note 12 on practition-
ers, see infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2004) (detailing Sentencing Commission's duty to
promulgate guidelines and policy statements); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2003) (explaining that Commission's principal purpose
"is to establish sentencing policies and practices . . . that will assure the ends of
justice by promulgating . . . guidelines prescribing . . . appropriate sentences").
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2004) (providing that if courts depart from sen-
tencing range prescribed in guidelines, they must specify reasons for departure);
see also United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that, re-
gardless of agreement with Sentencing Guidelines, courts "are obliged to apply
it"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2003) (maintaining that
"the sentencing court must select a sentence from the guideline range").
984
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objectives of the Reform Act: honesty, reasonable uniformity and propor-
tionality in sentencing.
25
Section 2Dl.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines specifically addresses of-
fenses involving drug trafficking and reflects an aim toward these three
objectives. 26 In an attempt to precisely correlate the punishment of con-
trolled substance offenses with the quantity of drugs involved, 27 the Sen-
tencing Commission developed a multi-tier system of sentencing in
Section 2D1.1. 28 This system has been said to reflect a philosophy of "in-
cremental immorality."
29
For example, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate that a defendant
with no significant criminal history who distributes fifteen grams of heroin
should receive a lower offense level (Level 16),30 and a correspondingly
lower minimum sentence (twenty-one months), 31 than a defendant with
an identical criminal history who distributes twenty-two grams of heroin
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (2003) (explain-
ing that "[t]o understand the guidelines and their underlying rationale, it is im-
portant to focus on the three objectives that Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984").
26. See id. § 2Dl.1 (containing heading "Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,
Exporting, or Trafficking... ; Attempt or Conspiracy") (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Section 2Dl.1 estab-
lishes the base offense level for defendants who agree or conspire to sell drugs,
based upon the quantity of drugs involved."); United States v. Marmolejos, 140
F.3d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that base offense levels "for defendants who
act as parties to an agreement or conspiracy to sell narcotics" are established by
Section 2Dl.1).
27. See United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 184 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining
that under Section 2Dl.1 "it is clear that the Base Offense Level for a drug-traffick-
ing offense is a function of the quantity of the drugs involved in the offense"), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1089 (2002); Yeung, 241 F.3d at 324 (noting that Section 2Dl.1
uses quantity of drugs involved to determine base offense levels); Dallas, 229 F.3d
at 107 (observing that Sentencing Commission demonstrated "zeal [in its efforts]
to calibrate narcotics punishments precisely with the quantity of narcotics
involved").
28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2003) (providing sev-
eral distinct "Levels" of drug offenses); see also Dallas, 229 F.3d at 107 (noting that
"the Sentencing Commission has specified seventeen different categories of quan-
tities, correlating each with a different base offense level").
29. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 670 (2d Cir. 1998) (ex-
plaining that "the Sentencing Commission should frame guidelines that take into
account the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense"); see also Dallas,
229 F.3d at 107 (citing Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d at 670). The Dallas court provided
an example of the incremental immorality philosophy: a defendant who distributes
fifty grams of cocaine receives a greater offense level (Level 16) and six more
months of minimum punishment under the Sentencing Guidelines than a defen-
dant who distributed forty grams (Level 14). See Dallas, 229 F.3d at 107 (detailing
this example).
30. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1 (c) (12) (2003) (setting
sixteen as offense level for at least ten, but less than twenty, grams of heroin).
31. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A (providing minimum sentence of twenty-one months
for defendant with offense level of sixteen and Criminal History Category of one).
2004]
5
Henry: Better a Drug Dealer than a Drug Buyer - The Third Circuit Grappl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
(Level 18)32 and receives a correspondingly higher minimum sentence
(twenty-seven months). 33
The above example demonstrates the philosophy of incremental im-
morality: A defendant's culpability increases with the quantity of heroin
distributed, 34 rather than having only one level of culpability for all heroin
distributions. 35 Similarly, the Sentencing Guidelines' concept of incre-
mental immorality for drug offenses under Section 2D1.1 does not distin-
guish between defendants who actually sell or buy drugs, and those who
merely attempt to do so. 3 6 Section 2D1.1 applies equally to those charged
with drug trafficking and to those "who agree or conspire to sell drugs,
based upon the quantity of drugs involved" when determining their re-
spective offense levels.
3 7
The Sentencing Guidelines contain Application Notes at the end of
each section.38 These notes provide guidance for the correct use of the
immediately preceding section,3 9 and must be given "controlling weight
unless [they are] plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" to
which they refer. 40 Application Note 12 to Section 2D1.1 establishes the
32. See id. § 2D1.1(c)(11) (setting eighteen as offense level for at least twenty,
but less than forty, grams of heroin).
33. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A (providing minimum sentence of twenty-seven
months for defendant with offense level of eighteen and Criminal History Cate-
gory of one).
34. See Dallas, 229 F.3d at 107-08 (discussing how incremental immorality in-
creases culpability in accordance with quantity of drugs involved in transaction).
35. See id. at 108 (explaining that Sentencing Guidelines assume logic of in-
cremental immorality "[w]hether or not selling ... more grams merits . . . more
months of punishment... ").
36. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2003) (explaining that
this section applies to both "Unlawful ... Trafficking" and "Attempt"); see also
United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1004 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "Section
2D1.1 of the [G]uidelines imposes punishment for drug-related crime based on
the type and weight of drugs involved in the criminal activity"); Daniel L. Abelson,
Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview and an Analysis, 86 MARQ. L. REV.
773, 778 (2003) (noting that under Guidelines, "a defendant [is normally] held
responsible for the drugs he agreed to sell to law enforcement").
37. See United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing
application of § 2D1.1 to defendant's sentence); see also Rodriguez, 975 F.2d at 1004
(concluding Guidelines punish based on type and weight of drugs involved).
38. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003).
39. See, e.g., id. § 2D1.1, Application Notes 1-20 (2003); see also Weil, supra
note 7, at 173 (describing guidance provided by Application Note 17 for § 2D1.1);
Mark Thomas, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: How Far Should the Federal Courts
Go?, 33 IDA-o L. REv. 147, 180 (1996) (stating that Application Note 12 "indicates
a concern" regarding Section 2D1.1 and reverse stings).
40. See United States v. Miller, 224 F.3d 247, 252 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (discuss-
ing obligation to adhere to Sentencing Guidelines (quoting Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993))); see also United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 108
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that regardless of agreement with Sentencing Guidelines,
courts "are obliged to apply it"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt.
A(2) (2003) (stating that sentencing courts are required to select sentences from
guideline range).
[Vol. 49: p. 981
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method for determining the quantity of drugs involved in offenses relating
to drug trafficking negotiations. 4 1 Further, in the event that no drugs
have been seized, or where the amount of drugs seized does not accurately
reflect the gravity of the offense, "the Guidelines require [a] ... court to
estimate the amount of drugs involved in the offense." 42
B. The Development of Application Note 12
Application Note 12 was amended twice in the 1990s.43 The Commis-
sion first amended and expanded Application Note 12 in 1992, in an
effort to "clarif[y] and simplif[y]" the provisions addressing unconsumma-
ted drug transactions and conspiracies to sell drugs.4 4 This amendment
made it clear that "[i]n an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a
controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted
distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount."45 Thus, in
a conventional sting operation, if a defendant was arrested before selling a
lower quantity of drugs to an undercover government agent than had
been originally negotiated, courts often imputed the negotiated quantity
to the defendant for sentencing purposes.46 Courts only altered this
41. See Yeung, 241 F.3d at 324 (noting Section 2D1.1 sets forth method for
determining drug quantities in unconsummated negotiations to traffic drugs); see
also United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Note 12 ... controls
the quantity used for Guidelines purposes in prosecutions arising out of stings,
reverse stings, and other situations where the delivered quantity of controlled sub-
stance may differ from the agreed-upon quantity."); United States v. Eschman, 227
F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Application Note 12
is designed to match the penalty to the true scale of the drug operation.").
42. United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (suggesting that Application
Note 12 "was designed to guide courts in assessing culpability where the amount of
the drug agreed upon and the amount of the drug actually delivered were differ-
ent"); United States v. McLean, 287 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2002) (requiring court
to approximate amount of narcotics involved); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 21.1, Application Note 12 (2003) ("Where there is no drug seizure or the
amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approxi-
mate the quantity of the controlled substance.").
43. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003) (re-
placing prior language with 1992 amendment), with id. at app. C, am. 518 (replac-
ing 1992 amendment with 1995 amendment). See also United States v.
Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing differences between
1992 and 1995 amendments).
44. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003) (discuss-
ing Sentencing Commission's reasoning for 1992 amendment).
45. Id.; see also United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417-18 (3d Cir. 1999)
(examining Application Note 12 in context of negotiation to traffic illegal sub-
stances); United States v. Mustakeem, 913 F. Supp. 410, 414-15 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(concluding that Application Note 12 addresses quantity of drugs defendant in-
tended to, and was capable of, purchasing).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 432 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that drug quantity to be used in negotiation offenses is weight of drugs contem-
plated during negotiations); see also United States v. Piccolo, 132 F. Supp. 2d 326,
332 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing newer version of Application Note 12 and noting
2004]
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method for determining quantity upon a finding that the defendant did
not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the
negotiated amount.4 7 Under such circumstances, the court would ex-
clude the amount the defendant did not intend to produce and was una-
ble to produce from its guideline calculation. 48
This amendment, however, apparently missed its laudable goals of
clarity and simplicity.49 Subsequent to its adoption, the Sentencing Com-
mission acknowledged that disputes over the amendment's interpretation
led to extensive litigation.5 0 Thus, just three years later in 1995, the Com-
mission again substantially amended Application Note 1251 to its current
amount of money involved in transaction is irrelevant to calculation of offense
level based on quantity of drugs involved).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (discuss-
ing current and former versions of Application Note 12 and concluding current
version "amended the prior version of Note 12 to make lack of either intent or
capability a ground for reducing the quantity for which a defendant could be sen-
tenced. The previous Note 12 had permitted a reduction of quantity only if a
defendant lacked both intent and capability.") (internal citations omitted); see also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (amending prior
version of Application Note 12 to effectuate this change).
48. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003) (provid-
ing 1992 version of Application Note 12). The 1992 version stated, "where the
court finds . . . the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably
capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the
guideline calculation the amount.., the defendant did not intend to produce and
was not reasonably capable of producing." Id.
49. See, e.g., Raven, 39 F.3d at 433 ("Not only have the courts of appeals split,
but some have been unable to establish a consistent application of Note 12 even
among panels."); see also United States v. Tillman, 8 F.3d 17, 19 (11th Cir. 1993)
(finding that government bears burden of persuasion, but that it satisfies burden
by showing either intent to produce or reasonable capability of producing negoti-
ated amount of drugs); United States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 683-84 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that Note 12 allocates burden of persuasion to defendant to prove
lack of both intent and capacity to produce negotiated drugs); United States v.
Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir. 1991) (placing burden on government to
prove defendant's intent and capacity).
50. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) ("Dis-
putes over the interpretation of this application note have produced much litiga-
tion."); see, e.g., Raven, 39 F.3d at 432 (stating that issue in Raven involved burdens
of proof under Application Note 12); United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 480
(8th Cir. 1993) (litigating issues under former Note 12); Barnes, 993 F.2d at 682-85
(same); Tillman, 8 F.3d at 18-19 (same).
51. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (elimi-
nating language from former Application Note 12 and providing new terminol-
ogy). The Sentencing Guidelines state:
The Commentary to § 2Dl.1 captioned "Application Notes" is amended
in Note 12 by deleting: "In an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a
controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted
distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. However,
where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and
was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the
court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it
finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably
capable of producing."
988 [Vol. 49: p. 981
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formulation. 52 Similar to the former amendment, the Commission in-
tended this most recent amendment to "provide that in a case involving
negotiation for a quantity of a controlled substance, the negotiated quan-
tity [would be] used to determine the offense level." 53
The new amendment did, however, make three important changes.54
First, it made explicit 55 that in situations where the completed transaction,
rather than the related negotiations, more accurately reflected the quan-
tity of controlled substances involved, courts must use the quantity from
the completed transaction to determine the quantity for sentencing pur-
Id. The drafters inserted this amended version:
In an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, the
agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to deter-
mine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount deliv-
ered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. For example, a
defendant agrees to sell 500 grams of cocaine, the transaction is com-
pleted by the delivery of the controlled substance - actually 480 grams of
cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. In this example, the
amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. In
contrast, in a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled
substance would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense because
the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the
defendant. If, however, the defendant establishes that he or she did not
intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-
upon quantity of the controlled substance, the courts shall exclude from
the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that
the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or was
not reasonably capable of providing.
Id.; see also United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating
that in 1995, Amendment 518 deleted language of former Application Note 12
and inserted "a new set of instructions in its place").
52. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003)
(providing language of prior amendment to Application Note 12), with id. at app.
C, am. 518 (supplying language of most recent amendment to Application Note
12), and id. § 2D1.1, Application Note 12 (stating current version of Application
Note 12).
53. See id. at app. C, am. 518 (noting that "negotiation for a quantity of con-
trolled substance" will determine offense level of defendant); see also United States
v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that context of Application
Note 12 suggests that "it was designed to guide courts in assessing culpability where
the amount of the drug agreed upon and the amount of the drug actually deliv-
ered were different").
54. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003)
(highlighting changes in new amendment).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting
former Application Note 12 did not address amount of drugs to be considered in
completed transactions); Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 491 (stating that "Application
Note 12 now specifies that the actual weight delivered, rather than the weight
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poses.5 6 This provision benefits defendants who actually sold a lower
quantity of drugs than they had originally negotiated to sell.
5 7
Second, the amendment added an entirely new provision regarding
reverse stings.58 Current Application Note 12 now provides that, unlike a
conventional sting situation, "in a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity
of the controlled substance" more closely reflects the seriousness of the
offense "because the amount actually delivered is controlled by the gov-
ernment, not by the defendant."59 The former Note 12 made no refer-
ence to reverse stings.
60
Third, the amendment significantly altered Application Note 12's fi-
nal sentence. 6 1 Under the former Note 12, defendants in unconsum-
mated drug transactions could avoid the assignment of the full negotiated
56. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (stating
that "the negotiated quantity is used to determine the offense level unless the com-
pleted transaction establishes a different quantity"); see also Yeung, 241 F.3d at 325
("[I]t is quite clear from the language of amended Application Note 12 that when
a sale is completed, the amount delivered will typically 'more accurately reflect[ ]
the scale of the offense' unless a 'further delivery' is 'scheduled' or at the very least
is 'agreed-upon."'); Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 491 (concluding that for completed
transactions, current Application Note 12 utilizes actual weight delivered, instead
of negotiated weight, for sentencing purposes).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1001 (3d Cir. 1992)
(remanding for re-sentencing based on actual quantity sold). In Rodriguez, the de-
fendants negotiated to sell 3,000 grams of cocaine to undercover DEA agents. See
id. (stating facts of case). Instead, the defendants sold the agents a block contain-
ing 2,976 grams of boric acid covered in only 65.1 grams of cocaine. See id. (same).
The defendants were sentenced, inter alia, for selling the full 3,000 grams of co-
caine. See id. at 1002 (same). The court vacated the defendants' sentences and
remanded for re-sentencing, concluding that the boric acid and cocaine did not
constitute a "mixture" and, therefore, "only the 65 grams of cocaine in the three
kilogram packages" were to be included for sentencing purposes. See id. at 1008
n.14 (noting basis for remand and sentencing considerations).
58. See United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 539 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
that "the old Note 12 does not advert to reverse stings, while the new Note 12 has a
specific provision addressing them"); United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253
(2d Cir. 1997) (stating that "this court has utilized different approaches in apply-
ing the predecessor to Application Note 12 .. .in the reverse sting context").
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003); see also
United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that
"[a] drug buyer who lacks the full purchase price may nonetheless intend to ob-
tain the negotiated quantity by force or deception, or on a credit or consignment
basis") (quoting United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1497 (10th Cir. 1996)));
Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (citing United States v. Alaga, 995 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1993))
(stating that "[w]here the defendant is a buyer... [the defendant] negotiates for a
particular quantity, [and] he or she fully intends to commit the crime as
planned").
60. See, e.g., Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 n.2 (noting that current version of Applica-
tion Note 12 specifically addresses reverse stings while prior version of Note 12 did
not); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (stating that Second Circuit has used varying ap-
proaches when applying prior versions of Application Note 12 to context of reverse
stings).
61. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (discuss-
ing language of new amendment).
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amount for sentencing purposes only if they demonstrated that they did
not intend to provide and were not reasonably capable of providing the
full negotiated amount. 62 In contrast, the current Application Note 12
allows defendants to avoid an assignment of the full negotiated amount
upon a finding of either a lack of intent or ability.63 This change has sig-
nificantly lightened the burden carried by defendants seeking to reduce
their offense level in unconsummated drug transactions. 6 4 Nevertheless,
both versions of this final sentence essentially served the same function:
they provided certain defendants in unconsummated drug transactions
with a method to show that their offense level should not be determined
by the quantity of drugs negotiated for sale.
65
Interestingly, this final change to Note 12 under the new amendment
potentially precludes drug buyers from taking advantage of this last sen-
tence. 66 The last sentence of former Note 12 referred to a defendant not
intending to provide and being unable to provide the "negotiated
amount," a term that could refer to either drugs or money. 67 The new
62. See United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[u]nder the current version of [Application Note 12] the defendant is only re-
quired to show a lack of intent ora lack of capability"); United States v. Raven, 39
F.3d 428, 434 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "the final sentence of Note 12 is conjunc-
tive, not disjunctive: for a defendant to be sentenced on a lesser amount, the sen-
tencing court must find both lack of intent and lack of reasonable capability").
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (asserting "[i]f,
however, the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was
not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled
substance"); see also Munoz, 233 F.3d at 415 (stating that, under current version of
Application Note 12, defendants need only show lack of either intent or ability);
United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) ("This provision, added in
1995, amended the prior version of [former] Note 12 to make lack of either intent
or capability a ground for reducing the quantity for which a defendant could be
sentenced. The previous Note 12 ... permitted a reduction... only if a defendant
lacked both intent and capability.").
64. See, e.g., Dallas, 229 F.3d at 109 (noting that new amendment decreased
defendant's burden when pleading reduction of sentence).
65. See Raven, 39 F.3d at 435 (stating reasonable interpretation of former ver-
sion of Note 12 "as addressing how a defendant's base offense level may be deter-
mined in the first instance when a drug transaction remains unconsummated"); see
also United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that "Applica-
tion Note 12 to § 2D1.1 sets forth the method by which the appropriate quantity of
drugs is determined if the offense involves negotiation to traffic in drugs"); Abel-
son, supra note 36, at 778 (stating "if the defendant shows that he 'did not intend
to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity
of the controlled substance,' then the court must exclude that amount 'from the
offense level determination'") (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2Dl.1, cmt. n.12 (2001))).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding
that Note 12 only applies to defendants selling controlled substances).
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003) (stating
last sentence of prior amendment); see also Kim McCormac & Stephen C. Passen,
Seventeenth Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Law, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
481, 496-97 (1995) (discussing how, under Sentencing Guidelines, buyers are only
culpable for amount of drugs they can purchase).
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Note 12, however, only refers to a defendant not intending to provide or
being unable to provide the "amount of controlled substance." 68 Buyers
and sellers are both equally capable of not intending to produce, or being
unable to produce, a negotiated amount of either money (for drug
purchases) or drugs (for drug sales).69 On the other hand, only sellers are
able to produce an amount of a controlled substance. 7° The potential
exclusion of buyers in reverse stings from the last sentence of Application
Note 12 has resulted in a circuit split.
7 1
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE LAST
SENTENCE OF APPLICATION NOTE 12
A. Precedent in the Third Circuit's Jurisdiction Prior to Smack:
Raven, Mustakeem and Piccolo
1. United States v. Raven
72
The Third Circuit interpreted the former Note 12 to apply to both
drug buyers and drug sellers. 73 For instance, in United States v. Raven,
Donald Raven was arrested after a reverse sting while he was attempting to
work as a drug courier.7 4 Raven had planned to travel to Thailand and
return with multiple kilograms of heroin, but, upon arrest, was informed
that those orchestrating the journey were working for the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency. 7 5 The precise amount that Raven had agreed to smuggle
back into the country was unclear. 76 To determine the meaning of "pro-
duce" for purposes of Raven's intent and ability to produce the heroin at
68. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MNuAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (stating
last sentence of new amendment); see also United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d
1192, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that "in a reverse sting the defendant is re-
sponsible for the agreed-upon amount"); United States v. Brassard, 212 F.3d 54, 58
(1st Cir. 2000) (stating that last sentence of Application Note 12 applies only when
defendants sell, not buy, drugs); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (finding "the last sentence
of Application Note 12 reveals that it applies only where a defendant is selling the
controlled substance").
69. See United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
traditionally buyers and sellers should have same intent and impossibility
defenses).
70. See id. at 538-39 (noting "[b]ut on a second reading, it seems that the last
sentence cannot apply to reverse stings, because it refers to 'the defendant...
providing . . . the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance,' and surely
the 'controlled substance' is cocaine, not dollars") (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12 (2003))).
71. For a discussion of the circuit split arising from this potential exclusion,
see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
72. 39 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1994).
73. See id. at 436 (discussing effect of Note 12 on burden of proof and twice
mentioning "seller or buyer" defendant).
74. See id. at 430-31 (detailing facts of case).
75. See id. (same).
76. See id. at 431 (stating that on separate occasions, Raven agreed to smuggle
anywhere from three to twelve kilograms of heroin).
992
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issue, 77 the Third Circuit analyzed the former version of Application Note
12.78
The court in Raven specifically discussed former Note 12 in the con-
text of defendants other than just drug sellers.79 The Raven court stated
that the benefits of former Note 12's final sentence must have applied to
other defendants as well in order "to force the government to demon-
strate [the] level of culpability [of other types of defendants] when a drug
transaction remains unconsummated and ... intent and ability to consum-
mate the transaction are put in issue."80 The court recognized that the
former Application Note 12 could be interpreted as applying only to drug
sellers, but rejected this argument as fundamentally unfair.81 Thus, the
Raven court concluded that under the former Note 12, any potential re-
duction in a defendant's offense level should be equally available to both
drug sellers and drug buyers.8 2
77. See id. at 436 (summarizing Raven's argument as attempting to establish
"that [because he was merely a courier] Raven neither intended to 'produce' nor
was reasonably capable of 'producing' either heroin or money to pay for it").
78. See id. at 432 (quoting former Application Note 12); see also U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (stating former last sentence of
Application Note 12). The former last sentence of Application Note 12 reads:
However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to pro-
duce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated
amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the
amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing.
Id.; see also United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
Raven analyzed prior version of Application Note 12).
79. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539-40 (stating that Raven "explicitly discussed the
application of the last sentence of the old Note 12 to buyers, sellers, and couriers
alike"); see also Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n. I (" [W]e reject the plausible (but unsatisfy-
ing) argument.., that the last sentence of Note 12 applies only to drug sellers.").
The Raven court concluded that the government should bear the burden of
"demonstrat[ing] that the defendant intended and was able to complete the nego-
tiated transaction." See Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n.l (assigning burden to
government).
80. Raven, 39 F.3d at 436; see also United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 474
(7th Cir. 2001) (stating Application Note 12 should be "theoretically [applicable]
to defendants caught in such a sting").
81. See Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n. 11 (stating that while such argument was color-
able, it was fundamentally unfair that only in "unconsummated drug transactions
by sellers would the government have to demonstrate that the defendant intended
and was able to complete the negotiated transaction"); see also Smack, 347 F.3d at
539-40 (interpreting new Note 12 stating "[tlraditional principles of criminal law
would suggest . . . that buyers should also have the benefit of the mens rea and
impossibility defenses in the last sentence, mutatis mutandis").
82. See Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n.l 1 (stating that court did not believe Sentenc-
ing Commission intended for Note 12 to apply to drug sellers and not buyers).
2004] CASEBRIEF 993
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2. United States v. Mustakeem 8 3
In United States v. Mustakeem, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania interpreted the Raven holding. 84 Mo-
hammed Mustakeem was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to pos-
sess with intent to distribute more than five hundred grams of a mixture
containing cocaine. 85 Mustakeem contended that because the cocaine he
sought was always either possessed or controlled by the government, he
had no real ability to "provide" the cocaine at issue.8 6
The district court rejected this argument.87 In doing so, the court
concluded that "[w] hen the defendant is a drug buyer, [the former] Note
12 would address the quantity of drugs that the defendant intended to
purchase and was reasonably capable of purchasing."8 8 This interpreta-
tion by the district court applied former Note 12's final sentence to drug
buyers, and therefore recognized that former Note 12's last sentence ap-
plied to both conventional and reverse stings.
89
83. 913 F. Supp. 410 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
84. See id. at 415 (following Third Circuit's decision that Note 12 applies to
both buyers and sellers).
85. See id. at 411 (discussing conviction).
86. See id. at 411 n.2 (discussing Mustakeem's argument concerning his ability
to provide cocaine in question); see also United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 187
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (litigating meaning of "provide"). In Hinds, defendant Grego-
rio Hinds sold narcotics to an undercover police officer on three occasions. See
Hinds, 329 F.3d at 185 (explaining transactions between Hinds and officer). The
second transaction was supposed to be for powder cocaine, but the officer asked
Hinds if he could, instead, turn it into crack. See id. (quoting officer's request).
Hinds agreed and went to a friend for assistance with the conversion; the friend
declined to do it himself, and sent Hinds to an unidentified individual to complete
the process. See id. (stating cocaine was turned into crack in Hinds's presence).
Unbeknownst to Hinds, the friend was working as an informant for the police
officer. See id. (stating relationship with officer). Hinds was sentenced based on
both the crack and the powder cocaine sales. See id. at 185-86 (aggregating crack
and cocaine sales to determine Hinds' base offense level). Hinds argued that but-
for the informant, he would not have been able to "provide" the crack under Ap-
plication Note 12 and, therefore, it should have been excluded for sentencing pur-
poses. See id. at 187-88 (stating Hinds's contention that he was not "reasonably
capable of providing the crack without the assistance of the government inform-
ant"). The court rejected this argument. See id. at 188 (concluding nothing in
Application Note 12 suggests Sentencing Commission intended defendant's
interpretation).
87. See Mustakeem, 913 F. Supp. at 414 (rejecting Mustakeem's argument that
he could not produce drugs at issue).
88. Id. at 414-15 (quoting United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 437 (3d Cir.
1994)); see also United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating
Application Note 12 should be "theoretically [applicable] to defendants caught
in . .. a [reverse] sting").
89. See Mustakeem, 913 F. Supp. at 414-15 (quoting Third Circuit and finding
that word "produce" should be interpreted flexibly depending on circumstances).
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3. United States v. Piccolo 9°
In contrast, at least one court within the Third Circuit's jurisdiction
has limited the last sentence of the current Note 12 to drug sellers only.91
In United States v. Piccolo, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania had the opportunity to assess the effects of the
most recent amendment to Application Note 12 in the context of reverse
stings. 92 Salvatore Piccolo was put into contact with an alleged "major co-
caine trafficker" who was, in fact, an undercover agent with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 93 In the subsequent reverse sting, Piccolo
purchased ten kilograms of cocaine from the agent, and was convicted of
"conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine."
9 4
In his case, Piccolo attempted to utilize the last sentence of the newly
amended Application Note 12 to reduce his offense level.9 5 In response,
the district court found that, given the new language of Application Note
12, Piccolo's interpretation of the Note was "completely incorrect because
Piccolo was the customer, not the supplier."96 Further, the court held that
when "the defendant is the buyer of the drugs and negotiates for a particu-
lar quantity, the amount of money exchanged for the drugs is irrelevant
when determining the quantity of drugs to be used in calculating the of-
fense level." 97 Thus, the Piccolo court concluded that only sellers may util-
ize the last sentence of the current Application Note 12.98
90. 132 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
91. See id. at 332 (finding defendant's assertion-that drugs he was incapable
of providing be excluded from sentencing calculation-incorrect because defen-
dant was buyer).
92. See id. at 331-32 (discussing sentencing entrapment guideline in relation
to reverse sting operation).
93. See id. at 328 (setting forth facts of case).
94. See id. (specifying charges against Piccolo).
95. See id. at 332 (concluding that Piccolo was attempting to use last sentence
of Application Note 12 to "re-litigate" issue of downward sentence departure).
96. See id. (rejecting Piccolo's appeal and stating holding of case); see also
United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that
"Application Note 12 controls, and [the defendant] is held responsible for the
quantity of cocaine that he agreed to purchase"); United States v. Brassard, 212
F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "[t]he last sentence of application note
12 . .. deals with a defendant selling drugs"); United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d
249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that "Application Note 12 ... applies only
where a defendant is selling the controlled substance").
97. See Piccolo, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (explaining Application Note 12); see
also Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d at 1193 (stating that "in a reverse sting the defendant is
responsible for the agreed-upon amount"); United States v. Mustakeem, 913 F.
Supp. 410, 414-15 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (determining that "[w]hen the defendant is a
drug buyer, Note 12 would address the quantity of drugs that the defendant in-
tended to purchase and was reasonably capable of purchasing").
98. See Piccolo, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (denying applicability of last sentence of
Application Note 12 to buyers of drugs).
2004]
15
Henry: Better a Drug Dealer than a Drug Buyer - The Third Circuit Grappl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
B. United States v. Smack: The Third Circuit Considers the
Last Sentence of Current Application Note 12
1. The Factual Background of Smack
The facts of Smack are generally representative of reverse sting situa-
tions.99 The FBI monitored several conversations between Michael Reis, a
witness cooperating with the FBI, andJohn Shields. 0 0 Shields was hoping
to purchase cocaine from Reis, and told Reis about his associate, Smack,
who would aid in the cocaine's purchase and distribution.10 1
The precise quantity of cocaine that Shields and Smack agreed to buy
from Reis was difficult to determine. 10 2 The court found that "[i]t might
have been as much as five kilograms, plus five more on credit, as Shields
and Reis discussed initially."'1 3 After at least eight phone conversations,
the three met and discussed paying $54,000 for three kilograms, with four
more kilograms provided on credit. 10 4 Despite these negotiations, Shields
brought only about $18,000 to the meeting.10 5 This was enough for
Shields to purchase only a single kilogram.' 0 6 Shields claimed he would
have the rest of the money within a few hours, though both Shields and
Smack were arrested upon receipt of the single kilogram of cocaine.1
0 7
Smack pleaded guilty to attempting to possess and distribute approxi-
mately ten kilograms of cocaine.
10 8
2. Defining the Issues Presented by the Current Application Note 12
Smack provided the Third Circuit with an opportunity to interpret the
current Application Note 12, and the court concluded that "Note 12 is
opaque and confusing."10 9 While the Smack court did not address the
Eastern District's holding in Piccolo, it did state that even though Raven
99. See United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2003) (indicating
operation "was a reverse sting"); see, e.g., United States v. Panduro, 152 F. Supp. 2d
398, 400-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (buying cocaine from undercover agent). But see
United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 187 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (blurring distinction
between reverse and conventional stings, when government informant arranges
crack preparation for defendant to sell to police in conventional sting). For a
discussion of the notable facts of Hinds, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
100. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 535 (discussing information obtained through
monitoring).
101. See id. (detailing conversations regarding purchase of cocaine).
102. See id. (discussing purchasing as little as three to as many as ten kilo-
grams of cocaine).
103. See id. (discussing court's assessment of quantity involved).
104. See id. (specifying terms of transaction).
105. See id. (noting that participant brought less money than previously
discussed).
106. See id. (noting amount of cocaine Shields could purchase with $18,000).
107. See id. (noting immediate arrest).
108. See id. at 537 (stating terms of plea agreement).
109. See id. at 538 (noting ambiguity of current Application Note 12); see also
United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2001) (recommending that
Application Note 12 receive further revision); United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76,
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analyzed the former Note 12, there was good reason to continue to treat
Raven as precedential. 11° In Raven, the Third Circuit had concluded that
the last sentence of former Note 12 applied to both buyers and sellers in
unconsummated drug transactions and, therefore, applied to buyers in re-
verse stings.11 1 In considering Raven's holding, the Smack court enumer-
ated the distinctions between the former version of Note 12 applicable in
Raven and the current version applicable in Smack. 112 The court con-
cluded that none of these distinctions seemed "to compel the view that the
new Note 12 has necessarily consigned Raven to the trash heap."1 13
The earlier version of Application Note 12 at issue in Raven, however,
did not specifically address reverse stings.1 14 In contrast, the current Note
12 added language regarding reverse stings.1 1 5 This addition provided
that "in a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled sub-
stance [shall be used to determine] the scale of the offense because the
amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the de-
fendant."1 16 This may imply that the negotiated amount is the exclusive
85 (1st Cir. 1999) (suggesting language of Application Note 12 "still needs
refinement").
110. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 (decidiig that argument by Smack's original
counsel was supported by good faith basis).
111. SeeUnited States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 436 n.l (3d Cir. 1994) (conclud-
ing it was fundamentally unfair that only in "unconsummated drug transactions by
sellers would the government have to demonstrate that the defendant intended
and was able to complete the negotiated transaction").
112. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 535 (stating prior version of Application Note 12
applied in Raven). The Smack court stated three major differences between the
version of Note 12 considered in Raven and the version considered in Smack. See
id. at 539 n.2 (discussing differences). First, "the old Note 12 [did] not advert to
reverse stings, while the new Note 12 has a specific provision addressing them." Id.
Second, the former Note 12 referred to a defendant providing a "negotiated
amount," while the current Note 12 refers to a defendant providing an "amount of
a controlled substance." See id. (contrasting language). Third, "the defenses [of
lack of intent and inability] in the old Note 12 are phrased in the conjunctive,
while the defenses in the new Note 12 are phrased in the disjunctive." Id. For a
discussion of these differences, see supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
113. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 n.2 (finding that Raven may still be legitimate
precedent).
114. See, e.g., id. (stating that "the old Note 12 does not advert to reverse st-
ings, while the new Note 12 has a specific provision addressing them"); United
States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that "this court has
utilized different approaches in applying the predecessor to Application Note
12 . . . in the reverse sting context").
115. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 n.2 (distinguishing prior version of Applica-
tion Note 12 from current version by, inter alia, pointing to specific reference to
reverse stings in current version); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (stating that Second Cir-
cuit has used varying approaches in applying prior versions of Application Note 12
in reverse sting context).
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method of determining the scale of the offense in reverse stings.1 17 Fur-
ther, the current Note 12 also altered its final sentence to read:
If... the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to
provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-
upon quantity of the controlled substance, the courts shall ex-
clude from the offense level determination the amount of con-
trolled substance that the defendant establishes that he or she
did not intend to provide or was not reasonably capable of
providing. 118
These changes may exclude buyers-and therefore defendants-in
reverse stings from the benefits of the current Note 12's last sentence.1 19
This is so because Note 12's final sentence now refers to a defendant pro-
viding a controlled substance, "and surely the 'controlled substance' is [a
drug], not dollars."1 20 Because of these changes, it is unclear whether
defendants in reverse sting situations can take advantage of the last sen-
tence of current Application Note 12.121
117. See, e.g., United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1193 (10th Cir.
2001) (stating that, for sentencing purposes, defendants arrested in reverse stings
are responsible for negotiated amount regardless of amount of controlled sub-
stance actually exchanged); see also United States v. Brassard, 212 F.3d 54, 58 (1st
Cir. 2000) (opining that last sentence of Application Note 12, which provides alter-
native method of sentence calculation, only deals with defendants selling drugs
and, therefore, "clearly does not apply" in reverse stings).
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12
(2003).
119. See Brassard, 212 F.3d at 58 (stating that last sentence of Note 12 does not
apply to reverse stings); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (finding that plain language of last
sentence of current Application Note 12 "reveals that it applies only where a defen-
dant is selling the controlled substance").
120. Smack, 347 F.3d at 538-39; see also Brassard, 212 F.3d at 58 (stating that
"[t]he last sentence of application note 12 ... deals with a defendant selling drugs,
[and] clearly does not apply [to reverse stings]"); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253 (stating
that "[t] he plain language of the last sentence of Application Note 12 reveals that
it applies only where a defendant is selling the controlled substance"); United
States v. Alaga, 995 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing prior version of Note
12 and stating that "[t] he language of [Application Note 12] clearly indicates that
the negotiated quantity is conclusive except where the defendant was the putative
seller and neither intended nor was able to produce that amount").
121. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 14
(2003) (stating that, in reverse stings, negotiated amount is more appropriate for
sentencing determination). The Sentencing Guidelines conclude that because the
government controls the amount delivered in reverse stings, the agreed upon
quantity more accurately reflects culpability. See id. (noting government control of
quantity of substance prevents accurate sentencing on amount delivered). The
Sentencing Guidelines state:
[I]n a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance
would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense because the
amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the
defendant. If, however, the defendant establishes that he or she did not
intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-
upon quantity of the controlled substance, the courts shall exclude from
998 [Vol. 49: p. 981
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CASEBRIEF
The Smack court noted that this possibility-that the last sentence of
Note 12 does not apply to reverse sting defendants-has created a circuit
split.1 22 The First, Second and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals all appear
to have concluded that the last sentence of Application Note 12 does not
apply to reverse stings. 123 The Second Circuit has provided a representa-
tive explanation as to why this is so:
The plain language of the last sentence of Application Note 12
reveals that it applies only where a defendant is selling the con-
trolled substance, that is, where the defendant "provid[es] the
agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance." It is hard to
believe that the narrowness of this language is inadvertent, com-
ing immediately after a discussion of what happens in a reverse
sting, where the government agent "provides" the controlled sub-
stance and the defendant provides only the money to purchase
it124
This reasoning, however, is not necessarily conclusive. 12 5 For exam-
ple, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to apply the
last sentence of Application Note 12 to reverse stings. 126 Moreover, in
the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that
the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or was
not reasonably capable of providing.
Id.; see also Smack, 347 F.3d at 538-39 (finding that Application Note 12 demands
that agreed-upon quantity be used for sentencing purposes). In Smack, the court
stated:
[Application Note 12] seems to command that the agreed-upon quantity
of controlled substance, regardless of amount delivered, be used for sen-
tencing in a prosecution arising out of a reverse sting. On the other
hand, it seems to immediately qualify that statement ("If, however... "),
and provide the defendant some relief by way of "establish [ing]" lack of
ability or lack of intent. But on a second reading, it seems that the last
sentence cannot apply to reverse stings, because it refers to "the defen-
dant . . .providing .. . the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled sub-
stance," and surely the "controlled substance" is cocaine, not dollars.
Id. at 539; see also United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating
language of Application Note 12 "still needs refinement").
122. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 (finding that "there seems to be a circuit split
on this question").
123. See United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1193 (10th Cir. 2001)
("[I]n a reverse sting the defendant is responsible for the agreed-upon amount.");
Brassard, 212 F.3d at 58 ("The last sentence of application note 12.... which deals
with a defendant selling drugs, clearly does not apply [to reverse stings]."); Gomez,
103 F.3d at 253 (providing that Application Note 12's plain language dictates that
it should only apply when defendants sell drugs).
124. Gomez, 103 F.3d at 253.
125. See, e.g., Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 ("The Second Circuit's view is not
universal.").
126. See United States v. Minore, No. 99-30381, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12420,
at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 2002) (concluding that defendant had been caught in
reverse sting and "Application Note 12 . . .addresses the situation presented.");
United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ven though Note
2004]
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Smack, the Third Circuit suggested, but did not decide, that in "an offense
involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, [the last sentence]
of Note 12 applies" regardless of whether the defendant was a buyer or
seller.1
27
Further, the Smack court went on to note that the current Note 12
does not specifically address drug buyers at any point,' 28 and that this is a
significant shift from the former version. 129 The court argued that such
an omission is counter to "traditional principles of criminal law." 130 If
drug sellers may obtain the benefit of an offense level reduction by show-
ing a lack of intent or ability to sell the negotiated quantity, buyers also
should be able to obtain the same benefit by a similar showing.' 3 '
Finally, even if Application Note 12 is assumed to apply to both buyers
and sellers, exclusive of defendants in reverse stings,' 3 2 then "we would be
left with the peculiar result that [the] defenses [of lack of intent or ability]
would be available to all traffickers in controlled substances except buyers in
reverse stings."' 33 Such a result would mean that a defendant arrested while
attempting to buy drugs from an ordinary drug dealer would have the
[12] does not refer explicitly to reverse [stings], we have recognized that it theoret-
ically has applicability to defendants caught in such a sting.").
127. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 538 (suggesting last sentence of Application Note
12 applies equally to buyer and seller).
128. See id. at 539 ("[A]s to buyers in general, Note 12 seems to be silent-the
last sentence speaks only to sellers .... and nothing in the note speaks to buyers.");
see also United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is quite clear
from the language of amended Application Note 12 that when a sale is completed,
the amount delivered will typically 'more accurately reflect[ ] the scale of of-
fense.'"); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Applica-
tion Note 12 now specifies that the actual weight delivered, rather than the weight
under negotiation, should be used for calculating a defendant's sentence if the
sale was completed.").
129. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 n.2 (stating that prior version of "Note 12
refer[red] to the 'negotiated amount'-which could refer to money-while the
new Note 12 refer[red] to 'amount of controlled substance,' thus excluding buy-
ers"); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 447 (2003) (restat-
ing prior version of Note 12 as "the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted
distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable [offense level] . . . [unless]
the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasona-
bly capable of producing the negotiated amount.").
130. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 (discussing unusual result of this conclusion).
131. See id. (describing Application Note 12's failure to apply to buyers in
reverse stings as "peculiar").
132. See id. at 535 (stating that "Note 12 . .. controls the quantity used for
Guidelines purposes in prosecutions arising out of stings, reverse stings, and other
situations where the delivered quantity of controlled substance may differ from the
agreed-upon quantity").
133. See id. at 539 (finding this result unusual); see also United States v. Raven,
39 F.3d 428, 436 n.l (3d Cir. 1994) ("[I]t seems to us fundamentally unfair that
only in cases involving unconsummated drug transactions by sellers would the gov-
ernment have to demonstrate that the defendant intended and was able to com-
plete the negotiated transaction. We do not believe that the Sentencing
Commission intended such a result.").
1000 [Vol. 49: p. 981
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benefits of the last sentence of Note 12, while a defendant attempting to
buy the same drugs from the government in a reverse sting would not.
134
This outcome runs counter to the Sentencing Commission's notion of"in-
cremental immorality."' 3 5 There is no apparent reason why the culpabil-
ity, and hence, the deservedness of lengthier sentences, of defendants
involved in reverse stings is any greater than the culpability of ordinary
sellers and buyers.
136
The Smack court did not purport to resolve the proper construction of
Application Note 12,137 but was ostensibly calling "upon the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission to revise Application Note 12 to clarify the scope of drug
transactions to which the intent and capability defenses apply." 138 Indeed,
the court went so far as "to send a copy of [its] opinion ... to the Chairwo-
man and members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and its General
Counsel."13
9
IV. GETrING PUNISHED: THE ErFECTS Or APPLICATION
NOTE 12 ON SENTENCING
A. Better a Drug Seller than a Drug Buyer? The Effects of Differential
Treatment under Application Note 12
When a drug transaction is completed, Application Note 12 provides
that the amount actually exchanged will determine the scale of the of-
fense. 140 This rule applies to all completed drug transactions, including st-
134. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 (explaining that use of Application Note 12 in
this way would result in its application to all drug traffickers except buyers in re-
verse stings).
135. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1998)
(explaining concept of "incremental immorality"); see also United States v. Dallas,
229 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d at 670) (discussing
incremental immorality); Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n.11 (finding this result "funda-
mentally unfair").
136. See, e.g., United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stat-
ing that context of Application Note 12 suggests that "it was designed to guide
courts in assessing culpability" where there is variation between agreed-upon
amount of controlled substance and amount actually delivered).
137. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 ("We offer none of this commentary as a hold-
ing on the proper construction of Note 12 as it now stands.").
138. Id. at 534. The Sentencing Commission notices when there is extensive
litigation over Application Notes. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
app. C, am. 518 (2003) (noting that "interpretation of this application note has
produced much litigation"). Specifically, the provisions in Application Note 12's
prior versions have caused significant litigation. See, e.g., Raven, 39 F.3d at 432
(stating that issue in Raven involved burdens of proof under former Application
Note 12); United States v. Tillman, 8 F.3d 17, 19 (11th Cir. 1993) (litigating other
issues under prior version of Application Note 12); United States v. Smiley, 997
F.2d 475, 481 n.8 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680,
683 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).
139. Smack, 347 F.3d at 540-41.
140. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (providing that if "the sale is completed and the amount delivered more
2004] CASEBRIEF 1001
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ings, reverse stings and transactions the government only observed. 14 1
Interpretational problems arise, however, when the transactions remain
uncompleted. 14 2 In these situations, it is the amount under negotiation that
will determine the scale of the offense.' 43
Application Note 12 permits drug sellers in unconsummated transac-
tions to show that they were either incapable or did not actually intend to
go through with the negotiated transaction. 14 4 There is, however, a circuit
split regarding whether buyers are afforded the same opportunity.145 The
language of Note 12 seems to imply that they are not. 146
accurately reflects the scale of the offense," then that amount shall be used for
sentence determination).
141. See id. § 2D1.1 (stating that section applies to all "offenses involving
drugs"); see, e.g., United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2001) (conclud-
ing that Application Note 12 provides method for determining quantity if offense
involves negotiation to traffic in drugs).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 184 (3d Cir. 2002) (provid-
ing that Application Note 12 requires analysis of quantity of drugs "involved" and
"all relevant conduct"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1089 (2002); Yeung, 241 F.3d at 324
(finding that for unconsummated transactions, Application Note 12 "establishes
the base offense level for defendants who agree or conspire to sell drugs, based
upon the quantity of drugs involved").
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (providing that in "an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled
substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to
determine the offense level").
144. See id. (stating that if "defendant[s] establish[ ] that [they] did not in-
tend to provide, or [were] not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon
quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall exclude from the offense level
determination" amount defendants did not intend or could not provide).
145. For a discussion of this circuit split, see supra notes 122-27 and accompa-
nying text.
146. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (referring only to inability or lack of intent to provide negotiated amount
of"controlled substance"). The potential inequity of such a limitation is illustrated
by the following example. Presume defendant X is the target of a conventional
sting, and X agrees to sell fifty grams of heroin to undercover agents. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (setting forth facts of
traditional sting operation); Camp, supra note 6, at 1056 (describing conventional
stings as operations in which government agents offer to purchase contraband
from defendants). X is arrested before making the exchange. See, e.g., United
States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 2000) (arresting defendant before
completing exchange). If X is able to show that X either never actually intended
to provide or was unable to provide the full fifty grams, but instead only intended
to, or was able to, provide five grams, then the last sentence of Application Note 12
excludes the extra forty-five grams from X's sentence determination. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12 (2003) (providing that
when defendants establish lack of intent or ability to provide some of negotiated
amount of controlled substance, courts must exclude that portion for sentencing
purposes). Making such a showing is not impossible; X could show that X was
attempting to trick the agent, whom X believed to be an unwitting buyer, into
paying for fifty grams and getting only five. See, e.g., Dallas, 229 F.3d at 109 (stating
that once government shows defendant's initial intent to provide agreed-upon
amount, burden shifts to defendant to "'produce evidence tending to establish
lack of intent or inability to deliver the alleged quantity of drugs"') (quoting
22
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The defenses of inability and lack of intent provided in Note 12 yield
lower sentences for defendants who are able to use them successfully. 147
Although Section 2D1.1 is directed toward drug "trafficking" and, in gen-
eral, treats drug buyers and sellers the same for sentencing purposes, Ap-
plication Note 12 makes no mention of drug buyers.14 8 Further, Note 12
links the use of these defenses specifically to an inability or lack of intent
United States v. Hazut, 140 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1998))); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 975 F.2d 999, 1001 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing defendants' attempt to pass off
small quantity of cocaine as much larger quantity). Therefore, X would be sen-
tenced as if X only sold five grams. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2Dl.1, Application Note 12 (2003) (stating if defendants make this showing,
then "court[s] shall exclude" quantity defendants were unable or did not intend to
provide from sentence determination).
On the other hand, presume instead that X is the target of a reverse sting, and
that X agreed to purchase fifty grams of heroin from undercover agents. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
facts of traditional reverse sting operation); Meis, supra note 5, at 955 (describing
reverse stings as operations where "government agents pose as dealers of contra-
band in transactions that they arrange"). X is arrested before making the ex-
change, and X is able to show either that X did not actually intend to buy or was
incapable of buying the full fifty grams. See United States v. Panduro, 152 F. Supp.
2d 398, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that defendant caught in reverse sting did
not intend to purchase full amount charged). If the last sentence of Application
Note 12 does not apply to reverse stings, then X's showing does not affect X's
sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (referring only to lack of intent or ability to provide negotiated amount of
controlled substance, not money). Therefore, X is sentenced as if X purchased
the full fifty grams. See id. (concluding that, in reverse stings, agreed-upon quantity
more accurately reflects scale of offense for sentencing purposes).
Finally, these examples can be taken to a theoretical extreme. Presume that X
is a drug dealer and Y is a drug buyer. The police listen to X and Y's conversations
and discover that X has agreed to sell fifty grams of heroin to Y, who has agreed to
purchase it. Both X and Y are arrested before making the exchange. They both
are able to show that they either did not actually intend to provide or were incapa-
ble of providing the other party with the negotiated amount. For instance, X
might prove that X did not have access to more than thirty grams, while Y might
prove that Y only had enough money for thirty grams. If the last sentence of Appli-
cation Note 12 does not apply to drug buyers, then only X's sentence is deter-
mined as if X sold only thirty grams. Y, on the other hand, would be sentenced as
if Y bought fifty grams. Though there appears to be no direct precedent address-
ing such a sentencing aberration, the aforementioned examples seem to necessi-
tate it. These results run counter to the Sentencing Commission's policy of
incremental immorality: the different punishments do not appear to be linked to
culpability. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 670 (2d Cir. 1998)
(referring to Sentencing Guidelines as demonstrating incremental immorality); see
also Dallas, 229 F.3d at 107-08 (providing example showing that Sentencing Guide-
lines increase minimum sentences in relation to increases in quantity of drugs in-
volved); cf United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (suggesting
Application Note 12 appears to have been designed to guide courts in determining
culpability).
147. See United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing
defenses provided by Application Note 12 as beneficial).
148. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2003) (referring to
both drug sales and purchases generically as "trafficking"); see also, e.g., Smack, 347
F.3d at 539 (stating that "nothing in [Note 12] speaks to buyers").
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to provide a negotiated quantity of a controlled substance.149 Several circuit
courts have concluded that these factors categorically exclude drug buyers
from using the Note 12 defenses. 150 Moreover, even the Smack court
found this logic "seemingly compelling."' 5 1
In Smack, the court pointed to the possibility that Application Note 12
does not categorically exclude all buyers, but perhaps, only buyers in re-
verse stings. 15 2 Understandably, the court found that possibility unsatis-
factory. 153 Further, even if Note 12 does exclude only buyers in reverse
stings, it still creates an inequitable result, namely, that it may often be
more advantageous to be a drug dealer than a drug buyer for sentencing
purposes.
1 54
B. Advice to Practitioners
In Raven, the Third Circuit deliberately avoided an interpretation of
the former Application Note 12 that excluded drug buyers.' 5 5 The cur-
rent Note 12 makes it more difficult for courts to avoid the conclusion that
at least buyers in reverse stings, and perhaps buyers altogether, are ex-
cluded from the benefits of the last sentence of Application Note 12.156
Although the court in Smack did not rule on the correct interpretation of
the current Note 12, it did mention the possibility that Raven may not have
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 12
(2003) (providing for defense of lack of ability or intent only when defendant fails
to provide agreed-upon quantity of controlled substance).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Brassard, 212 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2000) (con-
cluding that Application Note 12 does not apply in context of reverse stings);
United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that Application
Note 12 applies only when defendant is drug seller).
151. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 (describing logical strength of categorical ex-
clusion of buyers from Application Note 12).
152. See id. (suggesting possible interpretation of Application Note 12).
153. See id. (finding this possibility "peculiar" and "a bit warped"). For a dis-
cussion of the Smack court's critique of this result, see supra notes 132-36 and
accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 436 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that court did "not believe that the Sentencing Commission intended such
a result"); see also Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 (explaining that "[t]raditional principles
of criminal law would suggest, though, that buyers should also have the benefit of
the mens rea and impossibility defenses in the last sentence").
155. See Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n. II (stating that court "reject[s] the ... argu-
ment ... that the last sentence of Note 12 applies only to drug sellers").
156. See, e.g., United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1193 (10th Cir.
2001) ("[I]n a reverse sting the defendant is responsible for the agreed-upon
amount."); United States v. Brassard, 212 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that
Application Note 12's last sentence does not apply to reverse stings); United States
v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The plain language of the last sen-
tence of Application Note 12 reveals that it applies only where a defendant is selling
the controlled substance .... ").
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survived the Note's recent revision.' 57 Therefore, would-be drug purchas-
ers busted in reverse stings may be significantly disadvantaged at trial. 158
Nevertheless, practitioners in the Third Circuit should be aware of
Raven's potential vitality. 159 If Raven still controls, then drug buyers in
general, including buyers in reverse stings, have access to the last sentence
of Application Note 12.160 This last sentence now gives defendants the
option to choose either inability to provide, or lack of intent to provide,
the negotiated quantity as a method of reducing the quantity of drugs
used to determine sentencing. 161 This significantly lightens the burden
from the former Note 12, which required defendants to show both inabil-
ity and lack of intent.1
62
Practitioners in this area should be prepared, however, for the possi-
bility that Raven has not survived Note 12's latest revision. 163 The lan-
guage of the current Note 12 may preempt the logic of Raven.164 If so, it
now may be only drug sellers who have access to the defenses of the final
sentence of the current Note 12.165
157. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 (explaining that "[w]e offer none of this com-
mentary as a holding on the proper construction of Note 12 as it now stands, nor
do we decide whether Raven has in fact survived the revision of Note 12").
158. See id. at 539 (explaining that, for buyers, "Note 12 seems to be silent-
the last sentence speaks only to sellers . . . and nothing in the note speaks to
buyers"); see also Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d at 1193 ("[I] n a reverse sting the defendant
is responsible for the agreed-upon amount."); Brassard, 212 F.3d at 58 (concluding
that last sentence of Application Note 12 does not apply in reverse stings); Gomez,
103 F.3d at 253 ("The plain language of the last sentence of Application Note 12
reveals that it applies only where a defendant is selling the controlled
substance .... ).
159. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 538 (holding Smack's trial counsel ineffective for
failing to utilize Raven as relevant Third Circuit precedent).
160. See id. at 539 (stating that "buyers should also have the benefit of the...
defenses in the last sentence"); see also Raven, 39 F.3d at 436 n.l (stating that
court "reject[s] the ... argument ... that the last sentence of Note 12 applies only
to drug sellers").
161. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, am. 518 (2003) (provid-
ing for sentence reduction when "defendants establish[ ] that [they] did not in-
tend to provide, or [were] not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon
quantity of the controlled substance"); see also Smack, 347 F.3d at 539 n.2 (noting
differences between former and current Application Note 12's defenses).
162. For a discussion of the changes to the former Application Note 12, see
supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text. See also Raven, 39 F.3d at 434 (stating
that "the final sentence of Note 12 is conjunctive, not disjunctive: for a defendant
to be sentenced on a lesser amount, the sentencing court must find both lack of
intent and lack of reasonable capability").
163. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 (concluding that Raven may not have survived
Application Note 12's latest revision, but urging there is "considerable room for
argument" that Raven should continue to operate in reverse stings).
164. See id. (noting that Raven may be preempted by current Application Note
12).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1193 (10th Cir.
2001) (finding that, in reverse stings, defendants are sentenced based upon
agreed-upon amount); United States v. Brassard, 212 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2000)
(concluding that Application Note 12 does not pertain to reverse stings); United
2004] CASEBRIEF 1005
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V. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Guidelines express a philosophy of incremental im-
morality. 16 6 "Since the shift to a sentencing scheme that strictly ties sen-
tencing to the quantities of drugs involved, many courts and
commentators have expressed concern over the large discretion that law
enforcement officials have in setting the amount of drugs 'involved' in a
case." 16 7 In no other situation is this danger as pronounced as in the con-
text of reverse stings.' 68 Thus, until the next amendment of Note 12,
practitioners in the Third Circuit must wait to find out whether Raven has
survived to ward against this danger.1 69
Michael T. Henry
States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that plain language of
last sentence of Application Note 12 demonstrates that it only applies when de-
fendants are selling controlled substances).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 670 (2d Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that Sentencing Guidelines demonstrate incremental immorality); see
also United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Martinez-Rios,
143 F.3d at 670) (noting that Sentencing Guidelines have been described as re-
flecting philosophy of incremental immorality).
167. United States v. Cambrelen, 29 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1998),
affd, No. 98-1724(L), 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3512 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2001).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that because of this discretion and potential for abuse, reverse sting cases "re-
quire the most careful scrutiny and a probing examination by the district court").
169. See Smack, 347 F.3d at 540 (offering no decision as to whether Raven sur-
vived Application Note 12's latest revision).
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